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Police Officer Witnesses Absolutely Immune from Section 1983 Liability: Briscoe v.
LaHue' — Congress phrased section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 2 as broadly as a
remedial statute may be written.' Declaring that "every person" who, acting under color
of state law, deprives anyone of a constitutional right is liable in damages,' section 1983
does not expressly incorporate any immunities from civil suit. 5 In construing the statute,
however, the United States Supreme Court has granted absolute immunity from liability
under section 1983 to several categories of government officials.°
In the recent decision of Briscoe v. LaHue , 7 the United States Supreme Court ruled
that police officer witnesses testifying within the scope of their duties are absolutely
immune from liability under section 1983.° The Briscoe decision substantially expanded
460 U.S. 325 (1983).
2 Section 1983 reads in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
• See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I, 4-5 (1980); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section
1983,  79 YALE L. REV. 322, 322 (1969) thereinafter cited as Note]. The Supreme Court, in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), identified three principal aims of section 1983. First, section 1983 was
enacted to override unconstitutional laws. Id. at 173. Next, the statute was intended to provide a
remedy where state laws were inadequate to protect constitutional rights. Id. at 173-74. Finally,
section 1983 was enacted to provide a federal remedy where state law was adequate to guarantee
federal rights but was not available in practice because of state officials failing to enforce those laws.
Id. at 174-75.
• See supra note 2. The plaintiff in a section 1983 action must prove only two elements to state a
claim for relief under the statute. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered a deprivation
of his constitutional rights (or rights under certain federal statutes), and second, that the deprivation
was caused by a person acting under color o: law. Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). Once
the plaintiff has met his burden of proof, he is entitled to the remedies provided under section 1983
unless the defendant can establish his immunity from suit. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53,
61 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). See generally Kattan, Knocking On Wood: SOME
Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND. L. REV. 941, 986-989
(1977) thereinafter cited as Kauai)]. But see Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1976)
(plaintiff also must prove intent or recklessness on part of defendant). See infra note 208 (discussing
defendant's burden of proof under absolute and qualified immunities).
• Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir.
1953). In his concurring opinion in Cobb, Chief Justice Magruder asserted:
The enactment in terms contains no recognition of possible defenses, by way of
privilege, even where the defendants may have acted in good faith, in compliance with
what they believed to be their official duty. Reading the language of [section 1983] in its
broadest sweep, it would seem to make no difference that the conduct of the defen-
dants might not have been tortious at common law; for the Act, if read literally, creates
a new federal tort, where all that has to be proved is that the defendants . under color
of state law ... [deprived the plaintiff) of rights, etc., secured by the Constitution of the
United States.
Id. at 706. See also Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. In Monroe, the Court held that section 1983 should be read
against the "background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions." Id.
• See infra notes 132-97 and accompanying text (discussing three Supreme Court decisions
where the Court granted absolute immunity under section 1983).
• 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
8 Id. at 326. See infra notes 56-81 and accompanying text (discussing Briscoe holding).
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existing immunity law under section 1983 by extending absolute immunity to a class of
government officials who do not perform quasi-judicial functions." With the Briscoe
decision, therefore, the Supreme Court once again has diluted the strength of section
1983 as a means of protecting- individual constitutional rights.'°
In his original complaint alleging violation of section 1983 and seeking compensatory
damages, petitioner Briscoe claimed that respondent, Police Officer LaHue, violated his
constitutional right to due process by falsely testifying in a state prosecution against
Briscoe." Specifically, Briscoe alleged that, when LaHue testified about a partial finger-
prim discovered at the scene of the crime which could be linked to Briscoe, LaHue knew
that his testimony was false. 12 Briscoe contended that the testimony was perjurious
because Laflue had received an FBI report which stated that the fingerprint was too
incomplete to be of value.' 3 The District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
granted LaHue's motion for summary judgment. on four separate grounds.'' The district
court held, first, the alleged facts did not support the contention that LaHue had testified
falsely; second, allegations of perjury alone were insufficient to state a claim for violation
of due process rights; third, LaHue was not acting under color of state law when he
testified at the criminal proceedings; and fourth, Briscoe was collaterally estopped from
asserting this claim as his conviction had been reversed.'' Briscoe then appealed the
district court decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.'" The
appeals court consolidated the case with a pending unrelated case, Vickers v. Hunley," for
review and decision.
In Vickers, petitioners Vickers and Ballard alleged that respondent, Police Officer
Hunley, had violated their constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by testifying
falsely as a witness at their criminal trial.'" Petitioners alleged that Hunley gave perjured
testimony when he suggested that Vickers and Ballard had harmonized their stories
before making statements to the police.'" Hunley gave this testimony, the petitioners
asserted, despite being aware that the petitioners had had no opportunity to correlate
See infra notes 132-97 and accompanying text (discussing prior Supreme Court decisions
emphasizing quasi-judicial functions as justification for extending absolute immunity under section
1983).
I' See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 434 (1976) (White, J., concurring) ("to extend absolute
immunity to any group of state officials is to negate pro rano the very remedy which it appears
Congress sought to create") (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)).
" Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 1981) (district court opinions unpublished).
Briscoe had been charged with committing first-degree burglary and conspiracy to commit first-
degree burglary and assault. Id. LaHue was called as a witness at two probable cause hearings and at
Briscoe's criminal trial. Id. At the time of the arrest, LaHue was a member of the Bloomington,
Indiana, police department. Id.
Id.
13
 Id.
' 4
 Id. at 715-16.
1 .3 Id.
a On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals had reversed Briscoe's conviction. Briscoe v. State,
180 Ind. App. 450, 388 N.E.2d 638, 643-47 (1979). The Court of Appeals held that, on the record,
the evidence was insufficient to support Briscoe's conviction. Id. at 647.
17 Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 1981) (district court opinions unpublished).
Briscoe, 663 F.2d at 717. At the time he testified, James Hunley was an officer of the Cedar
Lake police department, Id. The alleged action arose from circumstances surrounding the custodial
interrogation of Vickers and Ballard by the Cedar Lake police shortly after their arrest. Id.
'a Id. The petitioners alleged that Hunley knew that the statements were made two hours apart,
and before Vickers and Ballard had any opportunity to collaborate. Id.
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their versions of the facts.'" Petitioners claimed that Hunley's testimony irreparably
diminished the credibility of their statements in the eyes of the jury." In ruling on
petitioners' action under section 1983, a federal magistrate granted Hunley's motion to
dismiss on the grounds that Hunley's testimony was not given under color of state law,'
and that, as a witness, Hunley was entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability. 23
Subsequently, the District. Court for the Northern District of Indiana affirmed the
magistrate's decision."
Pressing their claims of constitutional violations, Vickers arid Ballard appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. After consolidating their case
with Briscoe, the court of appeals affirmed both trial court decisions." Addressing the
numerous issues raised on appeal," the appeals court held that all witnesses, including
police officer witnesses, are absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 for
testimony offered in criminal proceedings."
Mier the appeals court decided the Briscoe and Vickers cases, the United States
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari,' limited solely to the issue of whether section
20 Id.
n Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 327.
21 Briscoe, 663 F.2d at 717.
" Id. Additionally, the magistrate found that the petitioners' complaint did not allege that their
federal constitutional rights had been violated, because the false testimony of a witness at trial did not
constitute a due process violation unless it was knowingly used by the prosecutor to obtain a
conviction. Id.
2.4
 Id.
" Id. The court of appeals decision involved three cases consolidated on appeal. Id. Only two of
those cases were decided by the Supreme Court on writs of certiorari. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 326. The
third case, Talley a. Crosson, involved a claim of deprivation of constitutional rights to due process,
equal protection and effective assistance of counsel. Briscoe, 663 F.2d at 716. Defendant Talley was
found guilty of rape and armed robbery. Id. Subsequently, Talley brought a pro se complaint against
several government officials alleging that they used perjured testimony at the trial which resulted in
Talley's conviction. Id. The District Court fc r the Northern District of Illinois granted some of the
defendant's motions to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
against those parties. Id. at 717. The district court dismissed the remaining claims on the basis of
absolute prosecutorial and judicial immunities. Id.
" The three consolidated cases presented several issues concerning the scope of 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985(3). The common thread running through the cases, however, was the question of police
officer witness immunity in actions brought under section 1983. Briscoe, 663 F.2d at 715.
27 Id. at 720-21. The court of appeals noted that granting police officer witnesses absolute
immunity under section 1983 would override a fundamental purpose of the statute. Id. at 720.
Further, the court recognized that the policy considerations justifying absolute immunity for private
witnesses did not apply with equal force to police officer witnesses./d. at 719. While recognizing these
important considerations weighing against absolute witness immunity for police officers, however,
the appeals court concluded that recent opinions of the Supreme Court indicated that the Court
favored absolute witness immunity under section 1983. Id. at 720. Specifically, the appeals court
relied on dicta in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978), in which the Supreme Court stated
that witnesses should be absolutely immune from civil liability so that they could perform their
functions without intimidation. Id. at 512. Further, the court of appeals cited Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976), in which absolute immunity under section 1983 was discussed approvingly by
justice White in his concurring opinion. Id. at 439-40. Briscoe, 663 F.2d at 721 n.30.
25
 Briscoe v. LaHue, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982). The petition for writ of certiorari presented the
following question: "Whether a police officer who commits perjury during a state court criminal trial
should be granted absolute immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Briscoe, 460 U.S, at
329 n.5. The petition did not raise the question of immunity for testimony at pretrial proceedings
such as probable cause hearings, nor did the petition discuss whether the same immunity consid-
erations that apply to trial testimony also apply to testimony at probable cause hearings. Id. The
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1983 creates a damages remedy against police officers on the basis of their testimony as
witnesses in state court. proceedings. 2" First, the Court addressed principles of common
law immunity" and concluded that, at least with respect to private witnesses, the enact-
ment of section 1983 did not abrogate the absolute immunity existing at common law."
Next, the Court considered the intent of Congress in enacting section 1983 32 and stated
that Congress clearly intended to include traditional common law witness immunities in
actions brought under the statute." Finally, after discussing present-day policy consid-
erations," the Court ruled that the justifications supporting common law witness immu-
nity apply with equal force to police officer witnesses who testify in a judicial proceeding.'
Consequently, the Court affirmed the decision of the appeals court," holding that police
officer witnesses are absolutely immune from civil liability under section 1983 for tes-
timony offered in the scope of their official duties."
In three separate opinions, the dissenting Justices argued that police officer witnesses
should not have absolute immunity from civil liability' under section 1983." In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall contended that the doctrine of absolute witness
immunity was not a settled proposition when section 1983 was enacted in 1871. 39 Even if it
were, Justice Marshall argued, Congress intended to abrogate the doctrine with respect to
actions brought under the statute.4° Justice Marshall suggested further that the policy
considerations underlying both section 1983 and common law witness immunity, as
applied to police officer witnesses, do not justify absolute immunity for perjurious tes-
timony.' While expressing some reservations regarding Justice Marshall's analysis, Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun briefly concurred with the result Justice Marshall reached in
his dissenting opinion,'
As a result of Briscoe, police officer witnesses are absolutely immune from liability
under section 1983 for testimony offered in judicial proceedings:I 3 The Briscoe decision
Court, therefore, did not decide whether LaHue was entitled to absolute immunity for allegedly false
testimony at two probable cause hearings regarding Briscoe. Id.
29 Id.
3° Id. at 329-36.
3 ' Id. at 334.
32 Id. at 336-41.
" Id. at 341.
" Id. at 341-46.
39 Id. at 345-46.
36 Id. at 346. On its review of the pretrial orders dismissing the petitioners' complaints, the court
of appeals assumed that factual allegations of perjury in the complaints were true. Id. at 328 n.3. The
court also assumed that the petitioners had alleged a constitutional violation in that they had been
deprived of their liberty without due process of law by respondents' perjury in the judicial proceed-
ings that resulted in the petitioners' convictions. Id. Because the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the court of appeals' holding, the Court held that the same assumptions would hold, without
determining whether such assumptions were valid. Id.
37 Id. at 326. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined. Id.
39 Id. at 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 369 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 346-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4 ' Id. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 369 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
these two dissenting opinions, see infra notes 82-116 and accompanying text.
43 460 U.S. at 326.
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represents an extension of absolute immunity under section 1983 which, prior to Briscoe,
had been granted only to legislators,'" judges,' and prosecutors.' Briscoe reflects the
Court's willingness to insulate officials from potential liability even at the expense of
denying a remedy for violations of constitutional rights to individual criminal defen-
dants:"
This casenote first will set forth the reasoning employed by the Court in Briscoe." The
casenote then will examine the precedential framework underlying the Briscoe decision, 49
as well as a series ()leases in which the Court has rejected absolute immunity, and instead,
has applied a qualified immunity," After evaluating the merits of the Court's reasoning in
Briscoe,' the casenote will test that reasoning against the alternative rationale of qualified
immunity. 32 Finally, after examining the intentions of Congress in enacting section 1983 33
and the policies which support common law witness immunity," this casenote will propose
that a qualified, rather than an absolute, immunity for police officer witnesses best
preserves the intent of the common law while advancing the policies of section 1983. 53
1. BRISCOE V. LA HUE
A. The Majority Opinion: Acceptance of Absolute Immunity
for Police Officer Witnesses
The Briscoe Court began its opinion by noting that English common law recognized
absolute immunity for witnesses as early as 1772,'"' and that American courts have
incorporated the doctrine with only slight modification. 57 The Court noted that under the
44 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951). See infra notes 132-49 and accompanying
text.
" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967). See infra notes 150-80 and accompanying text.
" Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See infra notes 181-97 and accompanying text.
' A few lower courts faced with the issue of police officer witness immunity before Briscoe also
favored absolute immunity. Those courts were more willing to adopt the common law immunity and
to minimize the congressional policy underlying section 1983. - The courts that upheld absolute
immunity asserted that the threat of civil liability would prevent witnesses from disclosing valuable
and pertinent testimony. See, e.g., Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1036 (1983); Myers v. Bull, 599 F.2d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
901 (1979). Other lower courts faced with the issue of police officer immunity before Briscoe,
however, rejected absolute immunity and permitted a cause of action. Those courts stressed as the
critical factor the intended function of section 1983 to provide a remedy to individuals wronged by
official misconduct. See, e.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437
U.S. 904 (1978); Burke v. Miller, 580 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1978) (Winter, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
" See infra notes 56-119 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 123-206 and accompanying text.
5U See infra notes 207-33 and accompanying text.
'' See infra notes 234-97 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 298-322 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 248-67 and accompanying text.
"4 See infra notes 268.96 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 298-324 and accompanying text.
w Briscoe v. La Hue, 460 U.S. at 331.
" Id. Some American decisions required a showing that the witness' allegedly defamatory
statements were relevant to the judicial proceedings, but once this threshold showing was made, the
witness was granted an absolute privilege. See, e.g., Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 208-10, 44 So. 357,
361 (1907).
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common law doctrine of absolute witness immunity, a private party is immune from
subsequent civil liability for testimony offered in a judicial proceeding. 58 This doctrine,
the Court reasoned, rested on the perception that a witness' apprehension of subsequent
liability might induce self-censorship," and t.hat. public policy dictates that "the paths
which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as
possible." 6 °
Enactment of section 1983, the Court stated, did not abrogate the common law
doctrine of absolute witness immunity as it applied to lay witnesses." After analyzing the
legislative history of the statute, 62 the Court concluded that the debates of the Forty-
Second Congress did not support the petitioners' contention that Congress intended to
provide a damages remedy under section 1983 against police officers, or any other,
witnesses.63
 A civil action against a private witness would not lie under section 1983, the
Court continued, because the statute was limited to actions taken "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory."' When a
private witness gives testimony in the course of a criminal trial, the Court reasoned, that
act is not performed "under color of law." 65
 The Court concluded that the common law
doctrine of absolute immunity continued to be available to witnesses, 66
 and ruled that,
because a police officer who testifies in a judicial proceeding reasonably may he viewed as
acting in the capacity of a lay witness, the doctrine applied with equal force to police
officer witnesses."'
5"
 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 334. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 CoLum.
L. Rev. 463, 476 (1909) [hereinafter cited as Veeder].
" Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333. The Court noted two forms of potential self censorship. Id. First, a
witness might be reluctant to come forward to testify. Id. (citing Henderson v. Broomhead, 157 Eng.
Rep. 964, 968 (Ex. 1859)). Second, once a witness is on the stand, his or her testimony might be
distorted by fear of subsequent liability. Id. (citing Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me. 442, 446-47 (1895)). In
addition, the Court in Briscoe noted that some courts have expressed concern that, in the absence of a
privilege, honest witnesses might be subjected to liability erroneously because they would have
difficulty in proving the truth of their statements. Id. at 333 n.13. (citing Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis.
193, 198, 80 Am. Dec. 738 (1860); Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me. at 446)).
6° Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333 (citing Calkins, 13 Wis. at 197, 80 Am. Dec. at 741).
61 it at 334.
62 Id. at 336-41.
63 Id. at 341. Specifically, after analyzing both sections of the 1871 Act, the Court concluded that
section 1, now codified as section 1983, differed substantially from section 2, the civil and criminal
conspiracy section of the statute. Id. at 337. Recognizing that the legislative history supported
criminal punishment under section 2 for witnesses who conspired to give perjured testimony, the
Court in Briscoe maintained that this evidence did not show that Congress intended to abrogate
witness immunity in civil actions under section 1. Id. at 339. Further, the Court asserted that the
legislative history of the 1871 Act did not speak to the question whether Congress intended witnesses
to be civilly liable for false testimony. Id. at 341 11.26. Consequently, the Court concluded that
Congress did not establish the requisite intent to override the clearly established common law
immunity of witnesses from civil liability. Id. Justice Marshall reached a different conclusion about
Congressional intent. Id. at 363 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying
text.
" Id. at 329 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
"' Id. The Court did note, however, that it is conceivable that nongovernmental witnesses could
act "under color of law" by conspiring with the prosecutor or other state officials. Id. at 329 n.7. See,
e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, '17-29 (1980) (private parties accused of conspiring with judge
held liable under section 1983).
66
 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 334.
" Id. at 336.
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In its earlier decisions, the Court noted, certain officials who performed critical
functions in the judicial process had been granted immunity from civil liability under
section 1983." The Court cited two of its previous decisions as examples of cases in which
absolute immunity had been extended to government officials based on their highly
discretionary functions." The Briscoe Court concluded that the policy of extending to
participants in the judicial process "every encouragement to make a full disclosure of all
pertinent information" supported those earlier decisions." Reasoning that this "cluster of
immunities" applied to all persons integral to the judicial process, 7 ' the Court decided that
absolute immunity must be extended to include police officer witnesses who, by offering
testimony in criminal proceedings, perform a critical role in the fact-finding process."
As additional justification for its holding, the Briscoe Court stated that the public
policy considerations supporting absolute immunity for ordinary witnesses apply with
even greater force to governmental witnesses," The Court maintained that subjecting
governmental officials, such as police officers, to civil liability under section 1983 as a
result of their testimony could undermine both their contribution to the judicial proceed-
ings and the effective performance of their other public duties." Because a witness is
always subject to criminal sanctions,' the Court observed that the risk of a witness
imposing self-censorship greatly outweighed any deterrent effect gained by the creation
of a civil remedy under section 1983. 76 Finally, the Court reasoned that section 1983
actions against police officer witnesses could he expected with some frequency." Such
litigation, the Court decided, could well impose significant burdens on the judicial system
and on law-enforcement resources . 78
Consequently, the Court in Briscoe determined that the policies underlying common
law witness immunity and section 1983 supported its decision to grant absolute immunity
under section 1983 to police officer witnesses.'" A police officer testifying in a judicial
proceeding is acting as a lay witness, the Court concluded, and therefore is deserving of
68 Id. at 334.
69 Id. The Court cited Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), and Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976), in support of its position.
" Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 439 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring)).
r`
	
(quoting Butz v. Economou, 439 U.S. 478, 512 (1978)).
72 Id. at 336. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall disagreed with the Court's decision in
the Pierson and Imbler cases. Id. at 364 n.32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 343.
n Id. The Court held that it is "better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest
officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."Id. at 345
(quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
•" Id. at 342. Specifically, a witness who intentionally offers false testimony may be prosecuted
for perjury.
" Id. at 343. While the Court recognized that some defendants might be unjustly convicted on
the basis of perjured testimony by police officers, the Court concluded that the alternative of limiting
the police officers' immunity would disserve the broader public interest of protecting the judicial
system. Id. at 345.
" Id. at 343. The Court stated that defendants often will transform their resentment at being
convicted into allegations of perjury. Id.
" Id. The Court noted that lawsuits alleging perjury on the stand in violation of the defendant's
due process rights often raise material qUestions of fact, inappropriate for disposition at the sum-
mary judgment stage. Id. at 343 n.29. Therefore, the case often must proceed to trial and must
traverse much of the same ground as the original trial. Id.
70 Id. at 345-46.
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the absolute immunity accorded lay witnesses." 0 According to the Court, police officer
witnesses perform a critical role in the judicial process and, for that reason as well, are
absolutely immune from liability under section 1983. 8 '
B. The Dissenting Opinions
Justices 14Iarshall," Brennan," 3 and Blackmun' filed separate dissenting opinions. All
three Justices agreed that a police officer witness should not be granted absolute immu-
nity from liability for damages under section 1983.' 3 The Justices argued that Congress
did not intend to incorporate common law immunities under section 1983, and that the
policy considerations underlying common law immunities did not apply with equal force
to situations involving police officer witnesses.'"
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall first. stated that, contrary to the
majority conclusion, the issue of whether absolute immunity was available to witnesses in
1871 had not. been settled."' Justice Marshall relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
White v. Nicholls" to support his contention. In White, Justice Marshall noted, the Court
had rejected absolute immunity for a qualified immunity for statements made as part of
judicial proceedings in defamation actions.'" Citing While as the sole Supreme Court
pronouncement on the subject of witness immunity before 1871," ) Justice Marshall
concluded that if, in 1871, Congress had examined the subject of common law im-
munities, it would have concluded that the principles set forth in White represented the
settled law in the area."'
Id. at 336.
" Id. at 337.
" Id. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 369 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 369 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
" Id.
" Id. at 346. Moreover, Justice Marshall argued that, even if absolute witness immunity were
accepted at common law, some of the petitioner's allegations would not have been barred by common
law immunity principles. Id. at 350. Justice Marshall asserted that, in addition to alleging that LaHue
had testified falsely at his trial, Briscoe had alleged that LaHue had made knowingly false charges at
two probable cause hearings. Id. At common law, according to Justice Marshall, such allegations
would have formed the basis of an action for malicious prosecution. Id. at 350-51 & n.7. Further,
Justice Marshall asserted that both English and American courts permitted a plaintiff to bring an
action for malicious prosecution at common law, holding that no immunities barred such suits. Id. at
351 n.9. Moreover, Justice Marshall contended that the majority erroneously concluded that the
issue of immunity for testimony by a police officer at a probable cause hearing was not before the
Court. Id. at 351 n.10. Citing Supreme Court Rule 23(1)(c), which reads "the statement of a question
presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein," Justice
Marshall concluded that the question of witness immunity in one state court proceeding fairly
includes the issue of witness immunity in a related state court proceeding. Id.
" 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
89 Id. at 291. The Court in White began its analysis by noting the existence of various exceptions
to defamation liability, such as words used in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 286-87. The Court stated,
however, that the "term 'exceptions', as applied to cases like those just enumerated, could never be
interpreted to mean that a class of actors or transactions is placed above the cognizance of the law,
absolved from the commands of justice." Id. at 287.
9° Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 354 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority in Briscoe argued, however, that the White Court's
discussion of privileged statements in judicial proceedings was only dictum, and that the White
decision, therefore, could not be considered authoritative. Id. at 332 n.12.
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After examining the language and purpose of section 1983 as well as the events
leading up to its enactment," Justice Marshall further concluded that, even if witness
immunity had been a sealed proposition in 1871, Congress intended to abrogate the
doctrine in actions under section 1983 regarding participants in judicial proceedings."
Specifically, Justice Marshall noted that the members of the Forty-Second Congress did
not include in section 1983 any immunities from the statute's provisions.'" in addition,
Justice Marshall pointed out that. Congress explicitly stated that section 1983 should he
read to further its broad remedial goals."' By enacting section 1983, justice Marshall
stated, Congress intended to provide a remedy for victims of constitutional violations
committed by governmental officials." To promote the policy of remedying all constitu-
tional violations, Justice Marshall asserted, Congress drafted the statute without excep-
tions to reach all persons acting under color of state law. 97 Justice Marshall concluded,
therefore, that granting absolute immunity to police officer witnesses not only conflicted
with the language of section 1983 but directly contradicted the purpose for which the
statute was enacted."
Having concluded that legislative intent did not support the majority's position,
Justice Marshall then addressed the policy considerations justifying common law witness
immunity."" Justice Marshall maintained that those policies did not apply in an action
brought under section 1983 against police officers who testify in criminal proceedings.'
The common law extended absolute immunity to private witnesses, justice Marshall
reasoned, to prevent them from being intimidated by the threat of potential liability
because of their testimony,'" Police officials who testify within the scope of their duties,
argued Justice Marshall, are less intimidated by the threat of liability under section 1983
than are private citizens. 1 °2 According to Justice Marshall, a police officer who is normally
represented by government counsel and indenmified by the state for conduct within the
scope of his or her duties would be less likely to withhold incriminating testimony for fear
of civil liability." Further, Justice Marshall reasoned that, because the authoritative
position occupied by a police officer lends his or her testimony greater credibility, the
harm caused by intentional abuse of that authority is far greater. 1 °' Justice Marshall also
92 Id. at 347-50, 356-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall extensively examined the
legislative history of sections 1 and 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at
356-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Concluding that Congress could have intended to make state
legislators immune from civil liability under section I of the Act, id. at 364, Justice Marshall asserted
that no similar evidence existed to support an immunity for police officer witnesses. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
" Id. at 363 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9' Id. at 348-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall quoted Rep. Shellabarger, the sponsor
of the 1871 Act, as saying, "the largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly given
in construing such statutes. . .." CONC. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 68 (1871). Briscoe, 460 U.S.
at 349 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 348 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 350 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 364-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'"° Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
L0 Id. at 366 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'n Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Monell v. 15epartment of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
713 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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asserted that prosecutors have exhibited extreme reluctance in the past to charge police
officials with criminal perjury.'" The potential for a criminal conviction which acts as a
constraint on the average witness' testimony, Justice Marshall concluded, is therefore
virtually non-existent when the witness is also a police officer. 10 °
Finally, justice Marshall distinguished the Court's earlier decisions which had upheld
absolute immunity for certain government officials on the ground that the policy consid-
erations supporting absolute immunity for judges and prosecutors were far more power-
ful than considerations supporting absolute immunity for police officer witnesses.'"
According to Justice Marshall, judges and prosecutors must exercise a substantial amount
of discretion in performing their official functions, while witnesses sworn to tell the truth
do not. 10" Consequently, Justice Marshall concluded that the policy considerations sup-
porting absolute witness immunity under common law do not apply to police officer
witnesses subject to an action under section 1983."
Justices Brennan and Blackmun wrote separate dissenting opinions. Justice Brennan
disagreed with that portion of Justice Marshall's opinion which stated that Congress, in
enacting section 1983, did not intend to create any absolute immunity from civil liability
for governmental officials. 11 " This issue, justice Brennan maintained, had been decided
by the Court. in Pierson v. Ray"' and Imbler v. Pachiman." 2 Justice Brennan agreed,
however, with Justice Marshall's position that the extension of absolute immunity to police
officer witnesses did not conform to the policies supporting both section 1983 and
common law witness immunity. 13
Justice Blackmun criticized the methodology by which Justice Marshall had analyzed
the question of immunity prior to the enactment of section 1983 in 1871. 1 " The intent of
Congress in enacting section 1983 should be determined, Justice Blackmun maintained,
by considering whether absolute immunity was well-established in the common law in
1871 and whether the policies supporting absolute immunity are in accord with the
l°5 Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Nugent v. Sheppard, 318 F. Supp. 314, 317 (N.D.
Ind. 1970)).
me Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Newman, Suing the Law Breakers, 87 YALE L. J. 447, 449-50
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Newman)).
107 Id. at 364 n.32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 °8 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall asserted, however, that the legislative history of
section 1983 cast doubt on the correctness of the Pierson and Imbler decisions. Id. Justice Marshall
concluded that it may have been appropriate to import common law immunities into the statute if, in
enacting section 1983, Congress had merely sought to federalize the law. Justice Marshall argued,
however, that section 1983 was enacted to remedy deprivations of federally guaranteed rights and,
therefore, different policy considerations applied. Id.
'°° Id. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall contended that the majority erroneously
concluded that "immunity analysis rests on functional categories, not on the status of the defendant."
Id. at 366 n.39 (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 342). Justice Marshall asserted that, although
individuals within the government should be treated equally based on the functions they perform,
this principle did not mean that witnesses within the government should be treated the same as
private witnesses. Id. at 367 n.39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"° Id. at 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See infra notes 150-80 and accompanying text.
"2
 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See infra notes 181-97 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan indi-
cated, however, that, he did not agree with the Pierson and Imbler decisions. 460 U.S. at 346 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
"3 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 369 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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overall purpose of section 1983, 10 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun concurred in the result
which Justice Marshall reached, and asserted that the majority had failed to establish
sufficient basis for its decision in the language of section 1983, the history of the common
law, or relevant policy considerations.'"
Thus, the dissenting Justices in Briscoe asserted that neither the legislative intent.
underlying section 1983, nor the policy considerations justifying absolute immunity for
private witnesses at common law, supported granting absolute immunity front section
1983 liability to police officer witnesses."' Conversely, the majority in Briscoe maintained
that Congress intended to include traditional common law witness immunities in actions
brought under section 1983.'" In addition, the Court in Briscoe noted I hat, in cases before
Briscoe it had granted absolute immunity to certain categories of government officials, and
asserted that the policy considerations underlying those previous decisions supported
granting absolute immunity from section 1983 liability to police officer witnesses as
This casenote will examine those decisions relied upon by the Briscoe majority in
which the Court had granted absolute immunity under section 1983 to certain govern-
ment officials.'" In addition, the article will consider the reasoning employed by the
Court in those cases to support extending the doctrine of absolute immunity.'" Finally,
the casenote will address a series of different decisions rendered before Briscoe in which
the Court granted only a qualified, good-faith immunity to certain other government
officials.'"
11. A BSOLUTE 111IM UNITY UNDER SECTION 1983:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Section 1983 was enacted as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871' 23 and created
the primary private remedy for deprivation of federal constitutional rights by state or
local officials. 124 Congress initially enacted section 1983 as part of a legislative package
designed to combat racial discrimination in the South.' The Act reaches further than
equal protection violations, however, and includes all rights which spring from the
Constitution and federal law) ."
" 5 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun asserted that the determination does not rest
on statutory construction because the Court can assume that "members of the 42nd Congress were
familiar with common law principles." Id. (citing Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
258-59 (1981)).
"5 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 346-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 369
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1" Id. at 341.
" 9 Id. at 335-36.
120 See infra notes 132-97 and accompanying text.
121 Id .
122 See infra notes 207-33 and accompanying text.
I " Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
1" The statute provides a federal cause of action for damages and equitable relief against any
person who, acting under color of state law, causes a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitu-
tion of the United States. See supra note 2.
12' See, e.g. , Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-86 (1961) (extensive discussion of section I983's
legislative history and purpose). See also Developments in the Law — Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1137-56 (1977) (background of section 1983) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
"6 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1980). The following cases, while only a partial
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Although the statutory language of section 1983 excepts no person from its reach,'
the United States Supreme Court has held that the draftsmen of the Act intended to
incorporate into the statute certain common law immunities "well grounded in history
and reason."'" In three decisions prior to Briscoe, the Court extended absolute immunity
from civil liability under section 1983 to legislators,m judges,"° and prosecutors." This
section will discuss the rationale used by the Court in each of these three decisions to
justify extending absolute immunity to certain groups of governmental officials.
A. Tenney v. Brandhove: Legislative Immunity
In Tenney v. Brandhove,'" the Supreme Court for the first time faced the issue of
whether common law immunities should he extended to section 1983 actions) ." Spec-
ifically, the Court in Tenney considered whether a plaintiff may recover damages under
section 1983 against a state legislator acting within the scope of his or her official duties.'
In an eight,to one decision,' the Court held that a legislator is absolutely immune from
liability under section 1983 for actions committed within the sphere of legitimate legisla-
tive activity."'
The plaintiff in Tenney, William Patrick Brandhove, was summoned as a witness
before the Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities of the California Senate to
answer charges that his statements in a petition to the legislature and his previous
listing, demonstrate the breadth of the spectrum of constitutional rights protected by section 1983:
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168-72 (1961) (freedom from unlawful search); Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 510-14 (1939) (freedom from cruel and unusual punishment); Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197, 201-04 (4th Cir. 1966) (freedom from unwarranted mass searches); York v. Story, 324 F.2d
450, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1963) (right to privacy); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 404-06 (5th Cir. 1961)
(freedom from police brutality) , . Section 1983 will not, however, support a cause of action to redress a
violation of a federal statute by state officials where the statute does not create enforceable rights
under section 1983 or where Congress intended to foreclose enforcement of the statute through
section 1983. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Ciammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, 19
(1981).
127 See supra note 2. Rep. Shellabarger, the author and manager of the bill in the House, stated:
This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights.
All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and
beneficently construed.... The largest latitude consistent with the words employed is
uniformly given in construing such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant
to protect and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people.
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 68 (1871) (quoted in Briscoe v. LaH ue, 460 U.S. at 348-49
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
' Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
I" Id. at 372. See infra notes 132-49 and accompanying text.
0 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). See infra notes 150-80 and accompanying text.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-27 (1976). See infra notes 181-97 and accompanying
text.
131 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
133 Id. at 372.
134 Id. at 376.
05 Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion in which six Justices joined. 14. at 369. Justice
Black wrote a separate concurring opinion, emphasizing that the Court's opinion did not hold that
the validity of legislative action is co-extensive with the personal immunity of the legislator. at 379
(Black, J., concurring). Justice Douglas wrote the sole dissenting opinion. Id. at 381 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
06 Id. at 376.
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testimony before the Committee were contradictory. 137 On the advice of counsel, Brand-
hove refused to give any testimony and was prosecuted for contempt. 13" The Chairman
of the Committee read into the record a statement which related Brandhove's alleged
criminal record and which attempted to demonstrate the falsity of the statements made by
Brandhove in his petition to the legislature. 139 Brandhove commenced an action under
section 1983 against the Committee and various other parties alleging deprivation of his
constitutional rights.'"
To support its holding, the Tenney Court relied on the well-established common law
privilege of legislators to be free from civil liability for statements made, or actions
committed, in the scope of their legislative duties."' The Court noted that the nation's
founders considered freedom of speech and action in the Legislature so essential that the
United States Constitution expressly provides that members of Congress "shall not be
questioned . . . for any speech or debate in either House."'" Examining the policies
underlying common law legislative immunity, the Court extended absolute immunity to
include state legislators as well.'" The Court emphasized the necessity for legislative
immunity in enabling the legislators to discharge their duties effectively without fear of
incurring liability."' Accordingly, the Tenney Court decided that those representatives
who execute their official duties without fear of civil prosecution can best serve the
nation's voters. 145
After considering the general language of section 1983, the Court in Tenney further
concluded that Congress did not intend to abrogate the traditional common law immunity
afforded to legislators.'" Maintaining that Congress itself was "a staunch advocate of
legislative freedom,"" 7 the Court asserted that if Congress intended to abolish common
law legislative immunity under section 1983, it would have stated that intent with spec-
ificity. 14 " Consequently, the Tenney Court concluded that the common law legislative
immunity applied with equal force in actions brought under section 1983.' 49
Brandhove v. Tenney, 183 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
136 Id, at 122-23.
139 Id. at i23.
'" Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 369 (1951).
'' Id. at 372-75. The Court noted that in 1689 the Bill of Rights declared "that the Freedom of
Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any
Court or Place out of Parliament." Id. at 372 (quoting 1 W. & M. Sess. 2, c. II).
1 " Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372-73 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6).
143 Tenney, 341 U.S. at-372-75. Among the arguments that have been advanced in support of
legislative immunity are: (1) the danger of influencing public officials by the threat of a suit; (2) the
deterrent effect of potential liability on individuals who are considering entering public life; (3) the
drain on the valuable time of the official caused by insubstantial suits; (4) the unfairness of subjecting
officials to liability for the acts of their subordinates; (5) the theory that the official owes a duty to the
public and not to the individual; and, (6) the feeling that the ballot and the formal removal
proceeding are more appropriate ways to assure the honesty and efficiency of public officers.
Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 271-72 (1937).
'" Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373-74. The Court noted further that many of the states, in revising their
constitutions, took care to preserve the principle that the legislature must be free to speak and act
without fear of liability. Id. The Court stated that 41 of the 48 states existing in 1951 had specifically
provided in their constitutions for the protection of the legislative privilege. Id. at 375 & n.5.
'" Id. at 374.
'" Id. at 376.
147 id.
1 " Id.
`" Id. The Court then considered whether from the pleadings it appeared that the defendants
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B. Pierson v. Ray: judicial Immunity
Following the Tenney rationale, the Court granted absolute immunity from section
1983 liability to other governmental officials. The Court first extended the Tenney ration-
ale to grant absolute immunity from section 1983 liability to state court judges in Pierson
a. Ray.'" In Pierson, the Court considered whether a local judge could be held liable for
damages under section 1983 as a result of a conviction subsequently held unconstitu-
tional.•" The Court also considered whether police officers could assert the defenses of
good faith and probable cause in an action under section 1983 for unconstitutional
arrest.' 52 In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren, the Court held, first, that the
judge was immune from liability under section 1983 for acts committed within his judicial
jurisdiction,' and second, that the defenses of good faith and probable cause were
available to the police officers in an action brought under section 1983.' 54
In Pierson, municipal police officers arrested the black plaintiffs for using segregated
facilities, to which they were denied access by law, al an interstate bus terminal in Jackson,
Mississippi." A municipal police justice convicted the plaintiffs on charges of having
violated the Mississippi breach-of-peace statute,' and sentenced each plaintiff to the
maximum jail term.'" On appeal, the County Court acquitted one of the plaintiff's and
dropped the charges against the other plaintiffs." The plaintiffs subsequently brought
an action against the judge and the arresting officers based on the common law action of
false arrest and under section 1983.' 5" In reviewing the lower court decisions, the Su-
preme Court. held that the privilege of absolute immunity protected the judge under both
common law and section 1983 for acts committed within his official capacity.'" The Court
were acting within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Id. The Court concluded that investiga-
tive activities are as much a part of representative government as any other legislative function. Id. at
377.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas maintained that, while appropriate in some situations,
legislative immunity did not apply to the abuses of legislative power charged in Tenney. Id, at 381-82.
Noting that the Committee had deprived Brandhove of his constitutional right of free speech, id. at
382, Justice Douglas asserted that legislative immunity should apply only to those legislative func-
tions concerning speech and debate. Id. Justice Douglas contended that when, however, the legisla-
ture "perverts its power ... for an illegal or corrupt purpose," the rationale supporting absolute
immunity no longer applies. Id. at 383.
150 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The absolute immunity granted in Pierson applies only to state court
judges because section 1983 applies only to state or local officials, not to federal officials.
' 51 Id. at 551.
1 " Id. at 551-52.
'' Id, at 553,
154
 Id. at 557.
"S
 Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213, 215-16 (5th Cir. 1965), of 'd in part and rev'd in part, 386 U.S.
547 (1967).
' 5° Id. at 216.
'" Id.
ISO id.
15" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 550 (1967).
'" Id. at 558. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants in the district court case on both
counts. Id. at 550. Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed the lower court decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court of appeals held that the defendant-judge was
immune from liability under both section 1983 and the common law of Mississippi for acts commit-
ted within his judicial jurisdiction. Id. Concerning the defendant-police officers, the court of appeals
held that the officers would be liable under section 1983 for an unconstitutional arrest even if they
acted in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under an invalid state statute. Id.
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then remanded the case to the district court for a trial to determine whether the police
officers had acted in good faith and with probable cause. 16 '
As justification for its holding that judges are absolutely immune from civil liability,
the Pierson Court cited its decision in Bradley v. Fi,sher. 162 In Bradley, the Supreme Court
had held that the common law recognized the immunity of judges from liability for
damages, and that the immunity applied even in suits alleging malicious or corrupt
judicial actions.'"' The Court in Pierson reiterated the policy considerations underlying
the Bradley decision, emphasizing the strong public interest in granting judges total
independence to exercise their judicial discretion without fear of the consequences)"
Observing that erroneous decisions should be corrected by appellate review,'"' the Court
stated that to subject a judge to the threat of potential civil liability could so inhibit his or
her decisionmaking capabilities as to render the judicial process inoperable."'
After discussing the policies underlying common law judicial immunity, the Court
then considered whether the common law immunity applied under section 1983. 167 The
Court held t hat the common law doctrine of absolute judicial immunity was not abrogated
by section 1983.' Analyzing the legislative history of the statute,'" the Court concluded
that Congress did not intend to abolish "wholesale" all common law immunities,'" as
evidenced by the Court's decision in Tenney v. Bra ndltove . 111 The Pierson Court concluded
that the policy justifications underlying the decision to extend absolute immunity from
suit under section 1983 to legislators applied with equal force to judges,I 72
After deciding that the judges were absolutely immune from section 1983 liability,
the Court turned next to the claim against the defendant police officers.' In determining
the liability of the police officers, the Court looked first to the common law)" noting that
at common law a police officer never was granted absolute immunity from liability but
' 61 Id. at 557-58.
I" 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). The date of the Bradley decision is sometimes stated to be 1871,
apparently because the decision was rendered during the December, 1871 term of the Supreme
Court. Note, supra note 3, at 323 n.7.
Yl" Id. at 349.
'" Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. The Pierson Court asserted, it "is not for the protection or benefit of
a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences."
Id. at 554 (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868)).
1" Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
168 Id.
167 Id,
1 " Id.
169 Id.
' 7 ° Id. But see id. at 561-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas maintained that "the position
that Congress did not intend to change the common law rule of judicial immunity ignores the fact
that every member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that the words of the statute meant
what they said...." Id.
"1 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See supra notes 132-49 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note
3, at 326-29. The Note casts considerable doubt on the Pierson Court's basic assumption that judicial
immunity was as well established in 1871 as legislative immunity. Id.
175 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55. The Pierson holding does not foreclose section 1983 actions for
injunctive relief against state judges. See Koen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383, 1389 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (city
judges not immune from injunctive relief under section 1983). In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Douglas contended that a judge should not be immune from liability because the term "every
person" failed to except judges specifically. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 561-62.
1 " Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555.
'" Id.
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rather was accorded a qualified immunity for actions committed in good faith and with
probable cause."' According to the Court, the good faith standard protected a police
officer who arrested with probable cause even if the suspect's innocence was subsequently
proven."6 Concluding that the common law rationale applied as well to the situation
presented in Pierson,' 77 the Court held that a police officer who acted pursuant to a statute
which he or she reasonably believed to be valid, but which subsequently was held to be
unconstitutional, was immune from liability under section 1983.' 7' Under this rationale,
the Court maintained, the police officers could assert the defenses of good faith and
probable cause to avoid liability under the statute." 9 Thus, the Pierson Court applied only
a qualified immunity from section 1983 liability to police officers acting within the scope
of their official duties) 8°
C. Imbler v. Pachtman: Prosecutorial Immunity
The Supreme Court significantly extended the coverage of the doctrine of absolute
immunity under section 1983 first recognized in Tenney v. Brandhove in Imbler v.
Pachtman.'" In Imbler, the Court considered whether a plaintiff may maintain a section
1983 action against a state prosecuting attorney.'" In a unanimous decision,'" the Court
held that a state prosecutor, acting within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing
a criminal prosecution, was absolutely immune from civil liability under section 1983."
Moreover, the Court ruled that such absolute immunity from liability was applicable even
where the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or deliberately withheld excul-
patory information.'"
Following his conviction on a first-degree felony murder charge,' the plaintiff in
Imbler obtained his release from a state prison through a federal habeas corpus proceed-
ing.' "'
 Imbler then commenced an action against the prosecutor at Imbler's criminal trial,
'" Id. The court cited Ward v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 179 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1950) (action
for false arrest).
1" Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556-57.
'n Id. at 557.
17" Id.
' 79 Id.
1" Id.
1 " 424 U.S. 409 (1976). For a discussion of Tenney, see supra notes 132-49 and accompanying
text.
' 82 Id. at 410.
Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion expressing the view of five members of the Court.
Id. at 410. Justice White wrote a separate opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concur-
ring in the judgment but expressing the view that prosecutorial immunity should not extend to suits
charging unconstitutional suppression of evidence. Id. at 432. Justice Stevens did not participate in
the decision of the case. Id.
"4 Id. at 431. The Court left open the possibility that the prosecutor might enjoy only a qualified
immunity in his investigative or administrative capacity. Id. at 430-31. Cf. Brawer v. Horowitz, 535
F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir. 1976) (federal prosecutor absolutely immune from liability in Bivens -type
action) (Brawer involved an action against federal officials for constitutional violations; it is closely
analogous, however, to an action under section 1983 against state officials.)
Id. at 428.
18'3
 Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1974). On appeal, the Supreme CMirt of
California unanimously affirmed the lower court decision. People v. Imbler, 57 Cal.2d 711, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304 (1962).
'" Imbler , 500 F.2d at 1302. Imbler had filed a writ in the Supreme Court of California in 1963
which was denied. In re Imbler, 60 Cal.2d 554, 35 Cal. Rptr. 375, 387 P.2d 6 (1963). Subsequently, in
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and certain other government officials, seeking to recover damages under section 1983.' 88
Imbler specifically alleged that the prosecutor, Pachtman, had knowingly or negligently
used false evidence and had suppressed material evidence during Imbler's criminal
trial.'"
In its decision in Imbler, the Supreme Court refined its approach to the question of
extending common law immunities to section 1983 actions." Articulating a two-tiered
analysis, the Court stated that a court first should identify the common law immunity, and
then balance the interests served by that immunity against the plaintiff's interest in a civil
remedy.'"' Concluding that the common law incorporated the doctrine of prosecutorial
immunity, the Court identified preventing the harrassment of prosecutors by spurious
litigation as the underlying policy of the immunity.'" The Court maintained that a
prosecutor might be impeded in his or her duties by the threat of liability resulting from
the exercise of his or her independent judgment.' 93 Moreover, the Court stated that, as
suits against prosecutors could be expected with some frequency, a prosecutor's energies
and attentions could be diverted from important public duties.'" Further, for the crimi-
nal justice system to function properly, the Court asserted, the prosecution must possess
unfettered discretion in conducting a trial. 193 Consequently, the Court concluded that to
subject prosecutors to potential liability under section 1983 would jeopardize the funda-
mental basis of the criminal justice system.'" Finally, the Court noted that a prosecutor
always could he punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights.' 97
1968, Imbler filed a second habeas corpus petition in federal district court based on the same
contentions previously urged upon and rejected by the Supreme Court of California. lmbler v.
Craven, 298 E. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969). Specifically, Imbler charged that the prosecution had
knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material evidence in the trial in which Imbler was
found guilty of first-degree felony murder. Id. at 797-99. The district court found eight instances of
state misconduct at Imbler's trial and issued the writ. Id. at 799-812. Claiming that the district court
had failed to give appropriate deference to the factual determinations of the Supreme Court of
California as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the state appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
865 (1970). The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the district court had merely "reached
different conclusions than the state court in applying federal constitutional standards to the facts."
424 F.2d at 632. The state chose not to retry Imbler, and he was released. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 415.
1" Imbler, 500 F.2d at 1302. Imbler demanded actual and punitive damages from each defen-
dant as well as attorney's fees. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 416.
1 " Imbler, 500 F.2d at 1302.
1 " Id.
'' Id.
Id. at 424-25.
'" Id.
194 Id. at 425.
' 95 Id. at 426-27.
' 96 Id. at 427.
' 97 Id. The Court in Imbler stated that a prosecutor could be punished criminally for willful
deprivations of constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal counterpart of section 1983.
Id. Section 242 reads as follows:
Whoever, under color Of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the
punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
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D. Absolute Witness Immunity Under Section 1983
Although the issue had not been addressed specifically by the Supreme Court before
Briscoe, several of the Court's comments in recent decisions have indicated that a majority
of the Court favored absolute immunity for witnesses under section 1983.° Dicta in BiLiZ
v. Economou,``°
 a section 1983 action against officials in the Department of Agriculture, for
example, stressed t he necessity of absolute immunity for witnesses to protect participants
in trials from retaliatory litigation.'" Similarly, in a concurring opinion in Imbler,2"' Justice
White stated that witnesses must he free from the threat of liability to ensure full
disclosure of evidence.' With the Tenney,' Pierson,' and Imblerm decisions, moreover,
the Court demonstrated its willingness to extend absolute immunity to actions under
section 1983 where the discretionary nature of an official's conduct requires a high level
of protection. 21"
E. Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983
While the Supreme Court has granted absolute immunity in section 1983 act ions to
three categories of government ofhcials,m the Court has based several other decisions in
cases decided before Briscoe on the theory of qualified immunity.'" In each of these cases,
than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term of years or for life.'
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982). See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 309-10 (1940) (discussing evolution of section 242).
"8 In Briscoe, the court of appeals determined that these Supreme Court comments were
dispositive on the issue of immunity, and accordingly, based its conclusion that police officer
witnesses were absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 on the weight of those state-
ments. Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 1981). See supra note 27.
199
 438 U.S. 478 (1978). In Butz, officials in the United States Department of Agriculture (the
"Department") instituted proceedings against the respondent to revoke or suspend his commission to
sell commodities futures. Economou v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 689 (2d Cir. 1976).
The respondent sued under section 1983 for deprivation of his constitutional rights, alleging that the
action was in retaliation for his criticism of the Department. Id. at 690. The Court held that executive
officials exercising discretion in their duties are generally entitled to only the qualified immunity
outlined in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-49 (1974). Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 507.
2" Id. at 512. The Court stated that, "absolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges,
advocates and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harrassment or intimidation."
Id. (emphasis added).
201 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 432 (White, J., concurring).
0" Id. at 439.
2" 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951). See supra notes 132-49 and accompanying text.
204 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). See supra notes 150-80 and accompanying text.
3°5
 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976). See supra notes 181-97 and accompanying text.
206 Moreover, the majority of courts of appeals, in decisions prior to Briscoe, also demonstrated
their willingness to adopt absolute witness immunity. See, e.g., Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 666-67'
(5th Cir. 1982) (police officer witness; section 1983 action); Myers v. Bull, 599 F,2d 863, 866 (8th Cir.
1979) (per curiam) (police officer witness; section 1983 action); Burke v. Miller, 580 F,2d 108, 109
(4th Cir. 1978) (slate medical examiner witness; section 1983 action); Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336,
1339 (9th Cir. 1978) (private witnesses and former assistant U.S. attorney; action under section 1983
and the fifth amendment); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1976) (lay' witness in
federal court; Bivens action). But see Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dicta
rejecting absolute immunity for government official; Bivens action),
2°' Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (judicial immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) (prosecutorial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (legislative immunity).
2" The defense of absolute immunity will completely shield a defendant from liability, even if
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the Court has been unwilling to extend absolute immunity where a particular official's
need to exercise independent judgment has been tempered by the need to provide a
remedy to an allegedly wronged party.'" Rather, the Court has extended only a qualified
immunity from liability for actions committed in good faith."°
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,21 for example, the Court considered whether absolute immunity
shielded certain state government officials from liability under section 1983. 212 The Court
held in a unanimous decision 213 that the defendants enjoyed a qualified, not absolute,
immunity from section 1983 liability.'" Further, the Court stated that the degree of the
immunity varied depending upon the scope of discretion exercised by the official in
question.215
In Scheuer, representatives of the estates of students killed on the campus of Kent
State University brought actions under section 1983, alleging violation of the decedents'
constitutional rights.'" The Supreme Court ruled that the defendants enjoyed only a
qualified immunity from section 1983 liability,"" and remanded the actions to determine
whether the defendants had acted in good faith.'"
In determining the liability of the defendant officials, the Court looked first to the
policies and purposes of section 1983, 11 ° and then examined the functions and respon-
sibilities of the defendants in their capacities as officers of the state government. 220 The
Court noted that Congress enacted section 1983 to provide a civil remedy for violation of
the court determines that the defendant's actions were unconstitutional or blameworthy or both. See
ambler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). A
qualified immunity, however, permits a defendant to avoid liability only when his actions, albeit
unconstitutional, are not blameworthy. Gildin, The Standard of Culpability in Section 1983 and Bivens
Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the Constitution, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557, 560
(1983). If a defendant is defending under a claim of qualified immunity, therefore, he must, in the
majority of jurisdictions, demonstrate that his actions were not grossly negligent or performed with
an intent to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538
F.2d 53, 61 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Navarette v. Economou, 536 F.2d 277,
280 (9th Cir. 1976) (cases where burden placed on defendant). In a few jurisdictions, however, the
plaintiff retains the burden of proving that the defendant acted with gross negligence, recklessness
or intent. See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976).
202 Rather than focusing exclusively on protecting public officials from undue burdens, the
Court in each of these cases emphasized the overriding concern of preserving an individual's
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Scheuer v, Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974).
210 Id.
2 " 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
"2 Id. at 234. The Court also considered whether the actions were brought against the State of
Ohio and hence barred by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution. Id.
213
	 at 233. Chief justice Burger delivered the opinion of eight members of the Court; Justice
Douglas did not participate in the decision.
Id. at 247. The Court also determined that the plaintiffs' claims, as stated in the complaints,
were not barred by the eleventh amendment, and that, consequently, the district court erred in
dismissing the complaints for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 238.
212 Id. at 247.
" 6 Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 433 (6th Cir. 1972). Specifically, the plaintiffs brought the
action against the Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General and his assistant, various other named
and unnamed officials and enlisted members of the Ohio National Guard and the President of Kent
State University. Id.
SIT Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 250 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 243.
220 Id.
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constitutional rights, and that the statute necessarily included within its scope violations
caused by abuses of official power. 221 -r he Court determined, therefore, that government
officials, as a class, could not be exempted from section 1983 liability by virtue of a blanket.
immunity because such an immunity would defeat the purpose of the statute:2 ' 2 Although
certain highly discretionary duties, such as those performed by legislators and judges,
required absolute immunity protection,'" t he Court decided other duties required only a
qualified immunity. 221 Further, the Court held that the scope of the immunity should be
determined by examining the level of independent judgment exercised by a particular
official in performing those duties. 2"
In examining the duties performed by the defendants, the Scheuer Court determined
that officials in the executive branch of government perform a broad range of duties and
often must act swiftly and firmly because any deferral of action could constitute derelic-
tion Of duty. 226
 While recognizing the broad discretion which executive officials possess,
however, the Court concluded that a qualified immunity, while providing a means of
redress for deprivation of rights, constituted a sufficient means of limiting the outside
influences which might inhibit an executive official in the free exercise of his or her
official powers. 227
In several other decisions where the Court granted only a qualified immunity from
section 1983 liability to governmental officials, the Court has applied the rationale of
Scheuer.'1'he Court has extended only a qualified immunity, for example, to school
board members,229 police officers,'" prison officials,' federal executive officials,' and a
superintendent. of a state mental hospital,' The Court has based the decisions in each of
these cases on the conclusion that qualified immunity permits an official to exercise
independent judgment and at the same time, fosters the purpose of section 1983 —
providing a remedy to persons deprived of their federal rights by the malicious abuse of
official power.
221 Id.
222 Id.
2" Id. at 244. The Court distinguished the Tenney and filthier decisions on the basis of con-
gressional intent. Id.
2" Id. at 245. The Court compared the immunity granted to police officers in Pierson to the facts
presented in Scheuer. Id. at 244-45. The Court noted that only a qualified immunity was "available to
that segment of the executive branch of a state government that is most frequently and intimately
involved in day-to-day contacts with the citizenry and, hence, most frequently exposed to situations
which can give rise to claims under § 1983." Id. at 244. The Court reasoned that the same standard
which applies to the police branch of executive government should apply to the defendant officials in
Scheuer. Id. at 245-46.
222
	 at 247.
22s
	 at 246-47.
227
	 at 247. The Court stated:
Under the criteria developed by precedents of this Court, § 1983 would be drained of
meaning were we to hold that the acts of a governor or other high executive officer
have "the quality of a supreme and unchangeable edict, overriding all conflicting rights
of property and unreviewable through the judicial power of the Federal Government."
Id. at 248 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932)).
n" See infra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
229 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
n Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). While the Pierson decision was rendered prior to
Scheuer, the Court applied the same rationale in Pierson as it would later articulate in Scheuer.
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978).
2S2 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
223 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577-78 (1975).
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III. THE BRISCOE DECISION: AN ANALYSIS
Because the Court's decisions prior to Briscoe had not addressed the specific issue of
police officer witness immunity, two alternative rationales could have been employed by
the Court in deciding 13riscoe . 2'44 First, relying on the Tenney, Pierson, and I Oiler decisions,
the Court had sufficient precedential support for granting absolute immunity to police
officer witnesses, based on the Court's conclusion that police officer witnesses require the
same level of protection from liability as legislators, judges, and prosecutors.' Alterna-
tively, Scheuer and its progeny could have provided the Court in Briscoe substantial
justification for concluding that police officer witnesses are only entitled to a qualified
immunity from liability for testimony offered in good faith. 23 "
In evaluating whether certain groups of governmental officials should be absolutely
protected from suit under section 1983, the Supreme Court generally has employed the
two-step analysis set forth in Imbler . 2'7 Applying this analysis, the Court first seeks to
determine the status of the common law immunity relating to the particular governmen-
tal official in question. 2"" The Court then considers whether the public policies underlying
the common law rule justify extending the same immunity to actions brought under
section 1983. 239
The Court in Briscoe employed the I inbler test to determine whether police officer
witnesses should be absolutely immune from section 1983 liability.245 The Court correctly
concluded that, under common law, absolute immunity applied to all witnesses — includ-
ing police officer witnesses in actions under section 1983. 241 This casenote submits,
however, that when the common law rule is viewed in light of present-day policy consid-
erations, the analysis dictates an entirely different result."
This section of the casenote first will examine both the intent of 	 in enacting
section 1983 and the policies which supported common law witness immunity.' Based on
this examination, this casenote will assert that the policy considerations supporting abso-
lute immunity for private witnesses at common law do not apply in the context of a section
1983 action against a police officer witness.' Further, this casenote will maintain that
both the language of section 1983 and the purpose for which it was enacted suggest that
police officer witnesses should not have the added and unneeded shield of absolute
immunity." Next, this casenote will examine present-day policy considerations, and will
propose that no compelling justification exists for granting police officers greater immu-
nity from liability when they testify at trial than when they engage in any of their other
234 See infra notes 298-324 and accompanying text (proposal that Briscoe Court should have
adopted second alternative of qualified immunity).
235 See supra notes 123-206 and accompanying text (discussing background of absolute immu-
nity).
22"
	 supra notes 207-33 and accompanying text (discussing background of qualified immunity
under section 1983).
"7 I mbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421, 435 (1976). See supra notes 181 -97 and accompanying
text.
"' Id.
gas
240 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 341 (1983).
241 Id. at 330.
242
	 infra notes 248-324 and accompanying text.
242 See infra notes 248-67 and accompanying text.
244 Id.
245
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official actions. 216 For these reasons, this casenote will suggest that police officer witnesses
should be granted the same good-faith, qualified immunity from liability under section
1983 as they are afforded for other conduct within the scope of their duties."'
A. Private Witnesses at Common Law Compared with
Police Officer Witnesses Under Section 1983
Contrary to the Court's assertions in Briscoe, the policies underlying common law
witness immunity do not support absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for police
officers who testify in the course of their official duties."' At common law, absolute
immunity applied to lay witnesses to prevent them from being dissuaded from coming
forward with important information or fully and freely testifying at trial because of
possible civil liability."" In concluding that the policies underlying absolute witness im-
munity at common law support absolute immunity for police officer witnesses under
section 1983,'' 7° the Briscoe Court failed to recognize the significant differences between
police officer witnesses and private citizen witnesses. 251
Police officers daily face the possibility of liability for many of their official acts." As
a result, police officers are less likely to be intimidated by the threat of civil liability than
private citizens. 2 :'3 The likelihood that the fear of subsequent liability might induce
self-censorship, therefore, appears less likely with a police officer witness than with a
private witness.' Police officers, moreover, normally have a duty to testify to facts
learned while acting in their official capacity.'" An official with a professional interest in
securing a criminal conviction, therefore, probably would not shade his or her testimony
in favor of a defendant to avoid the risk of a civil suit." In addition to having a strong
	216
	 infra notes 268-96 and accompanying text.
247 See infra notes 298-324 and accompanying text.
2" Charles v, Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 669 (5th Cir. 1982) (Kravitch, J., dissenting); Burke v. Miller,
580 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1978) (Winter, J., concurring). See also Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 28
(D.C. Cir. 1977). In Briggs, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
stated, "[p]olicy considerations counselling the insulation of private citizens from civil liability arising
from their performance as witnesses do not apply with equal force when a complaint charges that
constitutional rights have been violated by a public employee operating from the witness stand." Id.
(emphasis supplied by the court).
4 ") Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 215, 220, HO Am. Dec. 738 (1860); Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me.
442, 446-47 (1851); Veeder, supra note 58, at 476.
2 'D Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345-46.
2 ' Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1982) (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
2" Littlejohn, Civil Liability and the Police Officer: The Need for New Deterrents to Police Misconduct,
58 U. DEr.j. URB. L. 365 passim (1981) (extensive discussion of civil actions against police officers)
[hereinafter cited as Littlejohn]. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 245 (1974) (police officers are
"frequently exposed to situations which can give rise to claims under § 1983"); supra note 224
(quoting from Scheuer decision).
"a Littlejohn, supra note 252, at 366 ("police have developed an amazing resiliency against
pressures to control their own abusive behavior").
254 Id. at 426-31 (potential liability has little effect on police conduct).
'" Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 366 (Marshal!, J., dissenting).
254
' Id. Cf. FED. R. Evil). 803(8)(B) (excluding from evidence at criminal trials matters observed
by police officers in course of duties). The Senate Report accompanying the Rule states the reason
for the Rule as being that "observations by police officers at the scene of the crime ... are not as
reliable . because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the
defendant in criminal cases." S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 7051.
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professional incentive to testify, police officers normally are represented by government
counsel and indemnified for damages by the state for conduct within the scope of their
employment:257 The officers, therefore, are frequently insulated from any economic
hardship associated with civil suits, and, as a result, are less likely to withhold incriminat-
ing testimony because of a fear of subsequent liability. 25'
Other differences between police officer witnesses and lay witnesses counsel against
cloaking police officer witnesses with absolute immunity from section 1983 liability. For
example, because a police officer comes to the witness stand cloaked in the authority of
the state,"" the authoritative position occupied by a police officer lends his or her
testimony greater credibility.'" Any harm caused by the intentional abuse of that author-
ity, therefore, would be far greater than harm caused by a private witness."' At the same
time, the threat of a criminal peijury prosecution, which serves as an important constraint
on t he testimony ofthe average witness, frequently lacks practical deterrent effect for the
police officer witness."' Prosecutors, who may often feel the need to maintain close
working relationships with law enforcement agencies, will be extremely reluctant to
charge police officers with perjury based on testimony offered during judicial proceed-
ings.'"
The Court in Briscoe asserted that the reason for granting absolute immunity to lay
nesses — lo encourage free and open testimony — applied with equal force to police
officer witnesses."' The Court failed to appreciate, however, the vast differences between
the two types of witnesses.'" In addition, the Court did not recognize the substantial
possibility for abuse stemming from the police officer's official position, which affords a
police officer witness greater opportunities than a lay witness to act with malice in
depriving an individual of constitutional rights."" Thus, by extending absolute immunity
"I Although a judgment is enforceable against the individual official, many state and local
governments indemnify their employees against such liability. See, e.g., CONN. GE s. STAT. ANN. §
7-465 (West. Supp. 1982) (local officials); Mn. ANN. Cons art. 78A, 16C (Supp. 1982) (state
officers); MISS. Cons ANN. § 25-1-47 (1972) (local officials); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17 (McKinney
Supp. 1982 -83) (state officers). See generally jaron, The Threat of Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil
Rights Act: Does 11 InIelere With the Performance of Stale and Local Government?, 13 URB. LAW 1, 19-22
(1981) (discussing various state insurance and indemnification programs).
2i" Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, emphasized that the defendants in Briscoe were
provided free counsel under IND. ConE ANN. §§ 34-4-16.5-5(b) and 34-4-16.5-18 (Burns Cum. Supp.
1982). Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 366 n.38 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2" Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L. Rev. 781, 783 (1979) (based on data
compiled from 149 section 1983 suits) [hereinafter cited as Project].
26<' Id. at 800-02 (concluding substantial bias exists in favor of defendant police officer in section
1983 actions).
2 " 1 Id. at 814 and passim.
2"2 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall described police pet:jury as prevalent. Briscoe, 460
U.S. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 172 (1947) (frankfur-
ter,. J., dissenting) (criticizing lack of credibility of American policemen); Younger, Is Constitutional
Protection in Search and Seizure Dead?, 3 TRIAL 41, 41 (1967) ("police perjury is commonplace");
Grano,A Dilemma far Defense Counsel: Spinelli - Harris Search Warrants and the Possibility of Police Perjury,
1971 U. ILL. L. F. 405, 409 (1971) (police not adverse to committing perjury).
223 Newman, supra note 106, at 450. See also Project, supra note 259, at 812-15; Amsterdam, The
Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 785, 787 (1970) (conclud-
ing civil suits for police misconduct are rare because of formidable obstacles, especially reluctance of
lawyers to bring suit).
zw Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345-46.
263 Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'"" Id. at 368 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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from section 1983 liability to police officer witnesses, the Court in Briscoe foreclosed the
potential of a civil sanction in precisely the type of situation where the need is most
pressing.'"
B. Common Law Witness Immunity Balanced Against
Section 1983 Policy Considerations
In addition to failing to recognize the significant differences between lay witnesses
and police officer witnesses, the Court. in Briscoe failed to appreciate that the policies
supporting the extension of absolute immunity to certain categories of government
officials did not justify granting absolute immunity to police officer witnesses. Because
Congress did not express an intent either to abrogate or incorporate the common law
immunities in suits brought under section 1983, 2" the Court has been justified in afford-
ing absolute immunity to certain government officials.'" This extension of absolute
immunity to governmental officials negates, however, the very remedy which Congress
sought to create under section 1983, 270 and the Court, therefore, has extended absolute
immunity only after a convincing showing that public policy supported the grant of
immunity."'
By applying this test, the Court before Briscoe had afforded absolute immunity only to
legislators,'" judges, 273
 and prosecutors.'" The rationale for extending absolute immu-
nity to these government officials was to protect the independence and impartiality of
participants in judicial proceedings and the integrity of the judicial system. 275 This section
267
 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (in situations of abuse of office, an action for
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees).
2"
 Presumably, Rep. Shellabarger, who introduced the bill to the House, would have taken
exception to any assertions that the Act was not subject to immunities if those remarks had been at
variance with the intent of the drafters of the Act. Rep. Shellabarger made no such statement to the
congressmen who made such remarks. Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights
Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. L. REV. 615, 622-23 (1970). See also Developments, supra note
125, at 1154 & n.112.
2e"
	 Court has applied common law immunities to actions under section 1983 to legislators,
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); judges, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967);
and prosecutors, filthier v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-27 (1976). See supra notes 132-97 and
accompanying text for a full discussion of these three cases.
273 See supra notes 2-5, 123-27 and accompanying text (discussing intent of Congress in enacting
section 1983).
27' Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Kravitch, J., dissenting). The dissent in
Briggs stated:
The unique importance of constitutional rights hardly needs restatement. Both Con-
gress and the Supreme Court have created special causes of action to provide a remedy
for official misconduct which infringes constitutionally protected interests. Given this
notably solicitous attitude toward the effectuation of constitutional guarantees, it can be
asserted with both reason and authority that absolute immunity is not to be extended to
the constitutional tort context absent the most compelling justification.
Id.
272 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). See supra notes 132 -49 and accompanying
273
	 v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). See supra notes 150-80 and accompanying text.
274
 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-27 (1976). See supra notes 181 -97 and accompanying
'" See supra note 47,
text .
text.
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of the casenote will demonstrate that this rationale does not support an extension of
absolute immunity to police officer witnesses in suits brought under section 1983. 2"
Legislators, judges, and prosecutors exercise substantial discretion in performing
their official functions.'" Judges must decide those disputes brought before them, includ-
ing controversial and highly emotional cases.'" In resolving these cases, judges often must
reconcile widely divergent testimony, assess witness credibility, and decide closely con-
tested issues."' Judges must have a vigorous and independent mind to perform such
delicate tasks, especially when they are forced to decide these issues in the heat of a trial:28'
A judge should not be forced, as a defendant in a civil suit, to explain the mental processes
which formed the basis of what is inherently a subjective decisionmaking process.''
Similar to judges, criminal prosecutors exercise a tremendous amount of discretion
2" See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 294-95 (granting judges absolute immunity but conferring upon
police officers only a qualified immunity). See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). In Barr, Justice
Harlan emphasized the need for discretion as an important factor in determining whether to grant
immunity from liability. Justice Harlan stated:
[T]he higher the post, the broader the range of responsibilities and duties, and the
wider the scope of discretion... It is not the title of his office but the duties with which
the particular officer sought to be made to respond in damages is entrusted ... which
must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which clothes the official
acts ... with immunity... .
Id. at 574.
2" Recognizing the need to protect the highly discretionary functions of legislators, the nation's
founders provided for legislative immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States
Constitution. U.S. Cousr. art. I, 6. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 372-73. This casenote will
not compare the legislative immunity (or the legislator's duties) to that of judges and prosecutors,
therefore, because it is a constitutional principle. While legislative immunity is provided for in the
Constitution, however, it appears not to have been universally accepted at common law. See, e.g.,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Mark/1y, Chief Justice Marshall asserted, "[i]f
one of the heads of the departments commits any illegal act . . . it cannot be pretended that his office
alone exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to
obey the judgment of the. law." Id. at 170.
279 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 566.
279 Rod gers,Judges Face Hard Choices in Crisis Cases, 66 A.B.A.J. 1053 (1980). See Bradley, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) at 348 ("judges decide controversies ... exciting deepest of feelings").
2" In support of its decision, the Pierson Court also stated that a defendant always retained the
right to appeal. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Appellate review is a method of correcting
judicial error, however, not a remedy for judicial misconduct. Kates, supra note 268, at 638.
Appellate review, therefore, provides no compensation for the financial, emotional and other harms
suffered as a result of the trial courts impropriety. Id. Moreover, if the defendant lacks the funds to
persevere to appeal, the lower court judge will never be punished for the constitutional deprivation.
Id. at 638-39. See also Note, supra note 3, at 329 (appeal is not satisfactory remedy for constitutional
violation).
2*1 Even though judges do exercise considerable discretion in performing their duties, the
Pierson decision has little support in the legislative history of section 1983. Those members of the
Forty-Second Congress who addressed the issue of judicial immunity assumed that judges could be
held liable under the statute. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (extensive
discussion of remarks made by various members of Forty-Second Congress). Further, the only
Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject of judicial immunity before the enactment of section
1983 indicated that judges could be held liable for malicious or corrupt acts carried out in excess of
their jurisdiction. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1863). The Court had not recognized an
absolute immunity for the judiciary until 1872 in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. ( t a Wall.) 335 (1872). See
supra note 162. The Pierson Court relied on the Bradley decision, however, as support for its holding.
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. See Kattan, supra note 4, at 958-59 (Pierson decision incorrectly decided). See
also Note,supra note 3, at 334-37 (judges should be accorded only a qualified, good-faith immunity).
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when acting in the scope of their official duties."' Prosecutors are granted a wide range of
selectivity in determining whether to commence or recommend a prosecution or to take
other action regarding a potential defendant:2 ' Having deckled to initiate a criminal
proceeding, prosecutors must. determine what particular charges are to he brought.
against the defendant., and must determine whether to accept a plea or to proceed to
trial." Finally, once trial has commenced, prosecutors must face difficult and often
split-second decisions concerning which witnesses to call, which specific facts to elicit from
each witness, and which other evidentiary matters to bring to the court's attention.'"
When prosecutors exercise t heir discretion to perform their official duties effectively,
they act in a "quasi-judicial" capacity:281 ' Prosecutors make discretionary decisions per-
forming an integral role in the judicial process,'" and, therefore, should enjoy the same
immunity from civil liability which protects judges. 2 "8
 Prosecutors should not be required
to exercise independent judgment while subject to the threat of civil liability for having
exercised that. discretion?"
The policies which justify granting absolute immunity from section 1983 liability to
judges, prosecutors, and legislators, however, do not apply in the context of police officer
witnesses.m As a witness, the police officer exercises no discretion in performing his or
her duties."' The police officer witness is required merely to answer truthfully all
questions asked of him or her, and may refuse to answer only when the requested
information would be sell-incriminating. 2" 2
 Where an official is not called upon to exer-
cise judicial or quasi-judicial discretion, the Supreme Court has refused in past cases to
extend to that official the protection of absolute immunity, regardless of any apparent
relationship of his or her role to the judicial system. 93
Guirnaraes, The Evolution of the Prosecutorial Function in America: The View of a Civil Law
Prosecutor, 12 Tun: PROSECUTOR 248, 248 (1976); North, Policy Guidelines: Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 15 THE PROSECUTOR 132, 132 (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as North].
	2"3
	 States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979) (Court recognized prosecutor's broad
discretion in both refusing to charge and selecting charge); North, supra note 282, at 133-34.
North, supra note 282, at 135; Imbler v. Pachiman, 424 U.S. 409, 426 n.24 (1976).
2" See Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979) (pro-
secutor's swearing of warrants to insure attendance of witness); Lofland v. Meyers, 442 F. Su pp. 955
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (prosecutor's withholding of evidence).
' Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), WV per curium, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
237 Id. at 406; Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1965) (prosecuting attorneys
acting as quasi-judicial officers should enjoy same immunity as judges). See also McCray v. Maryland,
456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972).
2" Robichaud, 351 F.2d at 536.
	2"9
	 Note, Immunizing the Investigating Prosecutor: Should the Dishonest Go Free or the Honest
Defend?, 48 FORDHAN1 L. REV. 1111 passim (1980) (absolute immunity fails to comport with purpose of
section 1983); Note, Quasi-Judicial Immunity: Its Scope and Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DU KE
L.J. 95, 106-07 (Pierson decision did not provide sufficient precedent for absolute prosecutorial
immunity).
290
 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978). TheButz Court stated: "Indeed, the greater
power of' such officials affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct. . . . In situations of
abuse, an action for damages against the responsible official can be an important means of vindicat-
ing constitutional guarantees." Id. See also Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344, 1349 (6th Cir. 1975),
vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 961 (1976), alf'd after remand, 540 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1976) (police
officer liable under section 1983 for falsely testifying in criminal trial).
2 " 1
 Briscoe v. LaRue, 663 F.2d at 719; Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 1982).
292 Charles, 665 F.2d at 668.
203 Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 1926) (prosecutor not immune when acting in other
than quasi-judicial capacity); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965) (recognizing
importance of quasi-judicial standard).
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Thus, the Court has extended absolute immunity to government officials whose
highly discretionary functions demand protect ion. 2"" The Court in Briscoe failed to recog-
nize, however, that police officers testifying as ordinary witnesses do not fall within this
category of government official.' Police officer witnesses exercise no judicial or quasi-
judicial discretion in the performance of their duty. 236 Consequently, the rationale which
supported absolute immunity under section 1983 for judges, legislators and prosecutors
does not support absolute immunity for police officer witnesses. 29 '
C. Qualified Immunity: A Sufficient Protection
for Police Officer Witnesses
While the Supreme Court has extended absolute immunity from section 1983 liability
to legislators,218 judges," and prosecutors, 3" the Court has refused to provide other state
officials with absolute immunity even though their duties involved some amount of
discretion and, in certain circumstances, the officials would have received absolute immu-
nity at common law. 3" 1 The Court instead has extended only a good-faith, qualified
immunity to school board members,3°2 state executive officials,"3 prison officials, 3" police
officers, 3" federal executive officials, 3" and a superintendent of a state mental hospital."'
The Court has based these decisions on the rationale that qualified immunity permits
officials to exercise their discretion and perform their official duties in good faith." At
the same time, qualified immunity fosters the purpose of section 1983, which is to provide
a remedy to pet-sons deprived of their federal rights by the malicious abuse of official
power.'"
In Pierson, the Court granted police officers a good-faith, qualified immunity from
liability under section 1983 for actions, other than testimony at trial, within the scope of
26-1 See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
256 Id.
707 See Comment, Charles v. Wade: Section 1983 Witness Immunity for Public Officials - , 16 GA. L.
REV. 721, 727 (1982) (stronger -argument for holding public official witnesses liable under section
1983 than for private witnesses) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
"s Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). See supra notes 132-49 and accompanying
text.
ear
	 v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). See supra notes 150-80 and accompanying text.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-27 (1976). See supra notes 181-97 and accompanying
text.
30'
	 Court has explicitly recognized that it is not hound by common law precedent in section
1983 actions. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424;
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554). Accordingly, the Court has extended only a qualified immunity to
administrative officials, although these officials enjoyed absolute immunity at common law. Compare
Alza v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 111 (1913) (absolute immunity under common law) with Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246 (1974) (qualified immunity under section 1983). The Scheuer Court based
its decision on the conclusion that the policies supporting the common law immunity did not apply in
the context of a section 1983 action. Id. at 248.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
sos Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
a" Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 563 (1978).
3" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
3" Butz v. Economou, 439 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
307 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577-78 (1975).
"6 See supra notes 208-33 and accompanying text (discussing rationale underlying qualified
immunity).
6" See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of section 1983).
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their duties.3° As long as police officers performed their duties in good faith and with a
reasonable belief that their actions were lawful, under Pierson they were immune from
liability under section 1983. 3 " This good-faith standard held true whether the alleged
violation arose during an investigation, arrest, or imprisonment. 312 The Pierson Court
stated that the common law never granted police officers absolute and unqualified
immunity, and held that the officers' need to exercise independent judgment was miti-
gated by the need for accountability to the public.'
The qualified immunity extended to police officers in Pierson should also apply to
police officers who testify at a criminal trial as part of their official duties," Police officers
exercise far less discretion when they testify in court than when they are making an arrest
or conducting a search." Nevertheless, although police officers must act with good faith
and probable cause in arresting or searching a suspect, police officer witnesses are not at
all accountable to the defendant under the rationale of Briscoe . 316
The Court in Briscoe contended that granting police officer witnesses a qualified
immunity from section 1983 liability would result in a proliferation of spurious claims
instituted to harass the officers and to collect money damages. 31 Permitting a cause of
action for perjury against police officer witnesses, the Court stated, could result in an
increase of litigation which could require police officers to spend more of their time
testifying in court." Granting police officer witnesses a qualified immunity from section
1983 liability, however, will not place an unduly heavy burden on the legal system because
police officers will not be subject to suit under section 1983 if their testimony is rendered
'n Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
3 " Id. See Kattan, supra note 4, at 978; Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police
Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1975) (discussing burden of proof and
standards for defining good faith under qualified immunity) (hereinafter cited as Theis).
312 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (section 1983 suits arising from false arrest and
imprisonment); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1981) (section 1983 action based on
illegal search, seizure and retention of property); Vasquez v. Snoiv, 616 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1980)
(section 1983 suit premised on illegal search).
3 ' 2 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555.
a" See generally Theis, supra note 311 (arguing for objective standard of good faith in actions
against police officers). The elements of the qualified immunity were described in Scheirer v. Rhodes as
follows: "It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity...."
416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
'n Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 1981); Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 668 (5th
Cir. 1982).
3 ' 5 See Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 961
(1976), aff'd after remand, 540 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1976). The Hilliard court asserted, "we think it plain
that a law enforcement officer who knowingly gives evasive, misleading, and deceptive testimony
during a criminal trial cannot escape civil liability... ." Hilliard, 516 F.2d at 1349.
317
 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. at 343. See also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 588-89 (1959)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan contended:
[T]he courts should be wary of any argument based on the fear that subjecting
government officers to the nuisance of litigation and the uncertainties of its outcome
may put an undue burden on the conduct of public business. Such a burden is hardly
one peculiar to public officers; . but the way to minimizing the burdens of litigation
does not generally lie through the abolition of a right of redress for an admitted wrong.
Id. at 588-89.
an Comment, supra note 297, at 738 (discussing potential increase in claims under qualified
immunity).
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in good faith. 3 ' 9 Constraining police officer witnesses to testify in good faith is not a
requirement that will over-burden the legal system.32° Where a right as fundamental as
the right to a fair trial is deprived, moreover, efficiency and time constraints should not he
primary considerations. 321 The due process right to a fair trial is the cornerstone of the
criminal justice system, and, therefore, greater deference should be given to remedies
designed to protect that right."'
CONCLUSION
Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all individuals, whatever
their position in government, are subject to the law. 323 In fact, the Supreme Court has
stated that "no man . . . is above the law," including all officials in government. 324 In light
of this principle, police officer witnesses should bear the burden of showing that the
testimony offered during court proceedings was made in good faith and with a reasonable
belief in the truthfulness of that testimony. With the Briscoe decision, however, a police
officer witness who testifies falsely in a criminal proceeding cannot be held liable for
unconstitutional conduct to the wronged party for damages under section 1983. Conse-
quently, the Court in Briscoe eradicated the effectiveness of section 1983 as the principal
means of protecting an individual's constitutional rights where false police officer tes-
timony is concerned.
Rather than an absolute immunity, therefore, this casenote suggests that the Briscoe
Court should have granted only a qualified immunity to police officer witnesses who
testify in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the truthfulness of their statements.
The extension of absolute immunity to police officer witnesses fundamentally conflicts
with the language and purpose of section 1983. In addition, the policy considerations
3 " See Bute v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) ("insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly
terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading"). In his dissenting opinion in
Briscoe, Justice Marshall maintained that police officers arrest much more frequently than they
testify. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. at 367 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to Justice Marshall,
suits against police officers filed in the Central District of California under section 1983 included only
thirty actions for false arrest. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal
Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 550-51 (1982)). Accordingly, Justice
Marshall contended that the majority's fears of substantially increased litigation were un founded. Id.
320 See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
321 Comment, .supra note 297, at 738.
The Twentieth century has witnessed a revolutionary expansion in the state's sphere of
competence accompanied by a concomitant increase in its effective power. Permeating
all areas of endeavor, its activities and spokesmen too frequently exalt the disideratum
[sic] of efficiency at the expense of values which, at least in the constitutional order,
ought to he of paramount and guiding influence.
Id. at 738 n.100 (quoting R. Walker, The Constitutional and Legal Development of Habeas Corpus as the
Writ of Liberty 7 (1960)).
3" U.S. CoNsT. amends. VI, XIV. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932) (rights
guaranteed by the first eight amendments are fundamental and protected by the fourteenth
amendment).
323 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).
124 Id. The Butz Court stated:
"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set
that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest
to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it."
Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)).
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which justified granting absolute immunity to lay witnesses at common law simply do not
support an absolute immunity for police officers testifying in criminal proceedings.
Absent such justification, the Court in Briscoe should have adopted the rationale employed
in several earlier decisions in which it granted various groups of government officials only
a qualified, good-faith immunity from section 1983 liability. In this way, the Court in
Briscoe could have achieved an equitable balance between the need of a police officer
witness to exercise independent judgment and the right of an allegedly wronged party to
seek restitution.
MARGUERITE M. DORN
